Events

The increased global mobility of capital and labour poses a number of challenges to national tax systems: intricate global structures to hide personal wealth from the eyes of tax administrators and regulators, conflicts about the international allocation of taxing rights, a fast-evolving international tax policy landscape. The seminar focuses on the topic of taxation in the global economy and aims to bring together international junior and senior researchers working on international taxation, tax avoidance and evasion, tax competition, tax harmonization and related topics. Presentations can be polished papers or work in progress. The aim is to learn from each other and to discuss in a friendly atmosphere.

The seminar takes place at Paris School of Economics and via Zoom.

Sign-up for the seminar mailing list here.

If you would like to book a private time slot to meet the speaker, please email Ninon Moreau-Kastler (ninon.moreau-kastler@psemail.eu) or Léo Czajka leo.czajka@psemail.eu specifying which session.

This project has received funding from the European Union (TAXUD/2022/DE/310).

2024-25 Calendar

Friday 20 September 2024 12:00-13:00

Salle R1-14

GOUPILLE-LEBRET Jonathan (ENS LYON) : Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax with Bertrand GARBINTI, Mathilde MUNOZ, Stefanie STANTCHEVA, and Gabriel ZUCMAN

Abstract: Using exhaustive administrative wealth and income tax data, we study a French wealth tax reformthat scaled back information reporting requirements below a certain wealth threshold. We developa dynamic bunching approach that permits estimating the average response to the reform, the share ofcompliers, and the LATE. Reported wealth declines sharply in response to the reform and annual wealthgrowth rates are on average 20% lower among affected taxpayers. This decline appears due to increasedevasion facilitated by the lower reporting requirements, as suggested by the fall in self-reported wealthbut the lack of response in third-party-reported labor and capital incomes. By contrast, the elasticitiesto tax rates estimated are very small and insignificant. This illustrates the critical role of informationreporting policies in shaping taxpayers’ behavior

Friday 27 September 2024 12:00-13:00

Salle R1-14

KYSAR Rebecca (Fordham University) : The Global Tax Deal and the New International Economic Governance

Abstract: The ethos of economic integration and trade liberation no longer reigns supreme. Instead of multilateral trade agreements, nations are turning towards protectionism and unilateralism. Yet in late 2021, nearly 140 countries agreed to a new global tax deal that is aimed at coordinating their tax systems to curtail tax competition and corporation profit shifting to tax havens, as well as constructing a new allocation of taxing rights among nations. Although multilateral trade agreements now seem out of reach, tax multilateralism is ascendant. This is surprising given the deep tradition of national control over tax policy. It also perplexing since international tax does not exhibit the same theoretical harmony between national and worldwide welfare that international trade enjoys. The traditional account offered by economists is that trade liberalization is a rising tide that will lift all boats because countries will produce according to their competitive advantages and trade the rest, making trade suitable for international coordination. In contrast, tax is largely described as a zero-sum contest for a fixed pot of tax revenues, deeming it ill-suited for collective action. If multilateralism in the economic sphere is dead, then how did this agreement come to be? And perhaps more puzzlingly, why did a global deal emerge in international tax, of all places? This Article attempts to explain the forces by which the global tax deal came to pass. It contends that we must look beyond traditional rationales for the explanation, instead examining the global tax deal within a broader foreign and domestic economic policy context. The Article concludes that the fall of multilateralism in the trade context and its rise in international tax can be explained by the same phenomenon—widespread dissatisfaction with the distribution of gains from globalization. This account not only illuminates the stakes at issue in the debate over the implementation of the new global tax system, but also extends the rationales for each of its two parts, or “Pillars,” beyond those proffered (and indeed beyond those typically discussed in international tax policy). Further, this explanation provides evidence that an alternative international economic order is emerging rather than the old Washington Consensus simply dying —one where marshaling resources to reverse fiscal austerity and address distributional concerns is on the agenda. Finally, the story of the global tax deal helps to identify troubling aspects of the new industrial and trade strategies that nations are embracing and offers alternatives to them.

Friday 4 October 2024 12:00-13:00

R1-14

LANGENMAYR Dominika (KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt) : Navigating the Amazon: The Incidence of Digital Service Taxes

Abstract: Large digital firms pay little profit tax in many countries, prompting several countries to introduce digital services taxes on these firms to indirectly tax their profits. We study the incidence of digital service taxes using data on Amazon, the largest online retailer. We find that Amazon increased its fees by almost the exact amount of the digital service tax. Firms using Amazon as a platform have largely been able to pass these increased costs onto consumers. On average, the incidence of digital service taxes falls almost entirely on consumers, though there is significant heterogeneity among countries.

Friday 18 October 2024 12:00-13:00

R1-14

WALLOSSEK Luisa (University of Oslo) : The Marriage Earnings Gap

Abstract: What happens to earnings upon marriage? Linking administrative and survey data from Germany, we show that there is a marriage earnings gap. Even after accounting for the child penalty, women’s earnings drop by 20% after marriage. We show that the marriage earnings gap results from both the extensive margin (women stop working) and the intensive margin (women work fewer hours), but not from a decrease in hourly wages. Labor supply disincentives from joint taxation can explain about one quarter of the marriage earnings gap, while we find no effect for labor supply incentives from changes in divorce law. Leveraging variation in norms created by the German separation, we find that gender norms are another important driver behind the marriage earnings gap.

Friday 8 November 2024 12:00-13:00

R1-14

LEJOUR Arjan (Tilburg University) : tba

Friday 29 November 2024 12:00-13:00

R1-14

OLBERT Marcel (London Business School) : tba

Friday 13 December 2024 12:00-13:00

R1-14

KNEBELMANN Justine (Sciences Po) : tba

Friday 14 February 2025 12:00-13:00

R1-14

TBA * : tba

Friday 7 March 2025 12:00-13:00

R1-14

TBA * : tba

Friday 21 March 2025 12:00-13:00

R1-14

TBA * : tba

Friday 28 March 2025 12:00-13:00

R1-14

MANELICI Isabela (LSE) : tba

Friday 11 April 2025 12:00-13:00

R1-14

FEREY Antoine (Sciences Po) : tba

Friday 25 April 2025 12:00-13:00

R1-14

TBA * : tba

Friday 23 May 2025 12:00-13:00

R1-14

TBA * : tba

Friday 6 June 2025 12:00-13:00

R1-14

TBA * : tba